Rwanda’s Role as a Spoiler in the Conflict Engulfing the Democratic Republic of Congo

1. Introduction.
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is extremely complex with many issues and arguably many spoilers which prevent resolution from occurring. To clarify, spoilers are defined as groups “that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for a variety of motives” (Newman, & Richmond, 2006). The two most commonly cited spoilers in the DRC are Uganda and Rwanda. This paper will focus on arguably the DRC’s biggest spoiler, Rwanda. In order to effectively analyze the conflict in the DRC in relation to Rwanda, one must also look at the rebel groups that Rwanda supports, as well as the groups that the DRC supports in order to combat Rwanda. Therefore, to explain Rwanda’s role as a spoiler several other parties must be looked at simultaneously.
This paper will employ Sandole’s Three Pillar Approach as a primary method of analysis. A research question will also be analyzed pertaining to the role of structural issues in the conflict. The paper will then explore the key findings that resulted from the analysis. Finally, the paper will move on to an intervention strategy and recommendations for the conflict based on the analysis as well as overall research on the topic.
2. Reasons for choosing this conflict and brief discussion of the conflict.
I was originally planning to study the conflict between Uganda and the rebel group, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). I was drawn instead to the conflict in the DRC for two reasons; one was a documentary film I saw, “Silent Rape of the Congo” and the other reason was the conflict’s magnitude.
The film, “Silent Rape of the Congo”, is a documentary hosted by an American woman who was herself a victim of rape in the United States. She interviews countless women in the DRC who were raped, as well as some of the soldiers and rebels who committed the rapes. They also visit a hospital in the DRC that heals women who were raped and many had sustained serious injuries to their reproductive organs. The film shows how serious rape is in the DRC and the massive scale on which it occurs. I realized from the film that the DRC was a country plagued by conflict and I felt very passionate about the injustices taking place there.
I was also very concerned with the magnitude of this conflict. One source captures the magnitude by stating that over 1,200 civilians die each day (Van Woudenberg, 2006a). The same source states that “it has been the deadliest war in the world today… the conflict in the (DRC)… has taken the lives of over 3.5 million people since 1998” (Van Woudenberg, 2006a). In contrast, some current mortality estimates are as high as over 5 million excess deaths since 1998. I felt somewhat ashamed that I knew nothing about this conflict and yet it had taken so many lives. This was another reason that I chose to study the conflict in the DRC.
What is the conflict in the DRC? To briefly summarize, the DRC has trouble controlling all of the territory and resources within its borders. The DRC also struggles with the many rebel groups which exploit minerals and terrorize civilians. Unable to stop or make peace with these groups, civilians are constantly targeted and the DRC has little control or ability to implement justice. Rwanda’s role in eastern DRC exasperates the conflict and contributes to mineral exploitation, rebel groups, and loss of authority for the DRC. Rwanda’s role really began with the influx of over one million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Among the refugees were “the perpetrators of the genocide - the Interahamwe militia and other Hutu army extremists - who soon established their control over the refugee camps set up by the international aid community” (Van Woudenberg, 2006b). The Interahamwe had originally planned to regain their strength and attack Rwanda from the DRC (Van Woudenberg, 2006b). To combat the Interahamwe, Rwanda supported Laurent Kabila’s rise to power in the first Congo war, which overthrew Mobutu. When Kabila declared he wanted Rwanda’s presence out of the DRC, Rwanda joined forces with Uganda to oust Kabila from power. For that reason, Rwanda was a major party in the second Congo war. The war failed to oust Kabila’s government but Laurent Kabila was killed during the war and his son, Joseph Kabila, became president of the DRC. Rwanda finally did withdraw all of its troops from the DRC, but continues to support rebel groups, exploit minerals, and exert control in eastern DRC, while also rallying to the aid of ethnic Rwandans and Tutsi’s in the DRC.
3. Description of analytical tools used to analyze this conflict.
The primary tool I will use to analyze this conflict will be Sandole’s Three Pillar Approach, a useful theory for mapping conflicts. This method results in mapping the conflict into three pillars: 1-conflict, 2-conflict causes and conditions, and 3-conflict intervention perspectives and processes. This method is useful for developing the last section of the paper which involves designing an intervention. Due to the limitations of this paper, the three pillar analysis is meant to be somewhat abbreviated. Therefore, I will attempt to highlight the factors which I find most relevant in the analysis.
The first pillar, conflict, looks at the parties, issues, objectives, means, conflict/conflict resolution orientations, and the conflict/conflict resolution environment. The second pillar, conflict causes and conditions, maps out the causes and conditions of the conflict at different levels including: individual level, societal level, international level, and global/ecological level. The third pillar, conflict intervention perspectives and processes, examines the objectives of third parties such as conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. The third pillar also maps out the orientations of third parties such as competitive vs. cooperative processes, negative peace or positive peace, and track 1 or track 2 processes.
Following the three pillar analysis, the paper will briefly examine whether structural issues such as poverty are a cause or condition of the conflict. This is important because the number of dead is quite large and the majority of the casualties are attributed to structural problems. Therefore, it is important to know how many deaths are attributable to the conflict and how many to poverty. This will be analyzed by examining a study that was conducted on crude mortality rate in the DRC.
4. Application of the three pillar approach to this conflict.
Pillar 1
Parties
With respect to Rwanda’s role as a spoiler, the main parties are the DRC and Rwanda. There are several related parties which the main parties either support or are allied with. This list attempts to include the most relevant parties while also remaining somewhat brief. Related parties include:
The Congolese army: The Congolese army is unpaid and, therefore, it has often been found committing violence and rape against Congolese civilians. The army falls under the DRC government but because the soldiers need money, the army has also been found, at times, to play a role in exploitation of minerals and other forms of corruption and war profiteering.
RCD: The acronym stands for Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie. They are a rebel group formerly supported by Rwanda. Hostility and resentment towards the RCD and its Rwandan backers was especially pronounced in North and South Kivu. The RCD asserted its rights to tax civilians and even raise taxes but offered no services to the people (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.122).
FDLR: The acronym stands for Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda. They consist of Hutu extremists and Interahamwe. Rwanda planned to deal with the FDLR but the DRC has reportedly supported the FDLR at times to combat Rwanda.
CNDP: The acronym stands for Congress for the Defense of the People. They are “a Tutsi rebel group responsible for the North Kivu war in October 2008” (Totolo, 2009). They were also supported by Rwanda and their leader is General Nkunda.
Mai Mai: Indigenous militias that oppose Rwanda’s role in Eastern DRC. As one source explains, “Rwanda’s military presence provoked an uprising of indigenous militias, the so-called Mai Mai, to counter Rwanda’s grip over eastern DRC” (Bøås, & Dunn, 2007, p.123).
Rwandophone: The term Rwandophone designates ethnic groups which originated or came from Rwanda. There are Rwandophone ethnic groups in the DRC, some of whom have lived there for hundreds of years. Two key ethnic Rwandophone groups in the DRC are the Banyarwanda (Rwandophones from North Kivu) and Banyamulenge (Rwandophones from South Kivu) (Autesserre, 2006, 28).
Issues
There are many issues in the DRC but for the sake of brevity, those issues listed below are those which appear most relevant to the relations between the DRC and Rwanda.

Resources/minerals:
Mineral exploitation is a serious issue in the DRC. FDLR, the Mai Mai, CNDP and other rebel groups “sustain their operations by trading lucrative minerals, such as coltan, cassiterite (tin ore), diamonds, and gold” (Gilpin, Morris, & Funai, 2009, 2-3). The minerals are smuggled out of the country, robbing the DRC of much needed public funds. According to one source, the minerals are then “transported to ports in Kenya and Tanzania before being shipped to smelting and processing companies in Asia” (Gilpin, Morris, & Funai, 2009, 2-3). The gold and mineral ores from the DRC are used in electronics products such as cell phones and computers. These minerals are the biggest source of revenue for rebels and militants that prey on civilians in eastern DRC (Lezhnev & Prendergast, 2009). An interesting point is that the DRC’s “mineral wealth did not spark the conflict… but war profiteering has become the fuel that keeps the region aflame and lies beneath the surface of major regional tensions” (Lezhnev & Prendergast, 2009).
As an example of Rwanda’s role in this, Rwanda gained around $320 million in 1999 alone from its combined activities in the DRC (Nest, Grignon, & Kisangani, 2006, p.52). A 2008 UN report showed “that countless tonnes of Coltan are still exported to Europe every month” and much of it is exported from Rwanda (Totolo, 2009). Additionally, illegal smuggling of the minerals into Rwanda is still occurring routinely. In 2008 Rwanda earned US$19.2 million from Coltan sales and most of that Coltan came from the DRC (Totolo, 2009).
Rape:
According to the UN, “all sides--government troops… as well as the militias--continue to use rape as a weapon of war on a barbarous scale” (Anonymous, 2008). The motives for rape include revenge for attacks by rival militias, ethnic cleansing, and a tool to undermine the enemy’s morale by inflicting shame, injury and disease. The trauma from rape cripples families as well as whole villages (Anonymous, 2008).
The scope of this crime is quite large. According to a UN report, “in the first six months of 2007 there were 4,500 cases of sexual violence reported in South Kivu alone” (Anonymous, 2008). Worst still is that for every one rape that is reported, as much as 10-20 cases could go unreported. Sadly, the perpetrator usually goes unpunished and the victim is shunned. Some groups even believe that raping a virgin gives the individual invincibility in combat. According to the UN rape here is a “deliberate attempt to dehumanize and destroy entire communities” (Anonymous, 2008).
Congo’s Army:
There are many examples of Congo’s army participating in exploitation, rape, and complicity with rebel groups. On the 11/29/09 episode of CBS’s 60 minutes there was a segment on the DRC and conflict minerals. In an interview a former rebel major said “we collected gold and then we went to buy medicines… ammunition… guns… we would buy those things from Congolese army soldiers” ("Gold war," 2009). This shows that the Congo army sometimes sold weapons to its enemies (i.e. rebel groups).
Additionally, soldiers are among the poorest section of Congolese society. One source states “salaries often remain at US$10, if they are paid at all” (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2008). In the DRC, US$10 is not sufficient to sustain a family and the soldiers are very dissatisfied (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2008). Soldiers also lack loyalty for their superiors and feel that civilians do not respect them or their situation (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2008).


Rwandan Support for Rebel Groups:
There are many instances of Rwanda supporting rebel groups in the DRC. For example, Rwanda was accused of “providing weapons to the RCD renegade commanders” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.127). Additionally, in the Ituri province in eastern DRC, Rwanda supported the rebel group, UPC, “with advice, military training and the delivery of ammunition” (Van Woudenberg, 2005). A former UPC spokesperson stated “‘it is not a secret that we were supported by the Rwandans,’ adding, ‘everyone is interested in our gold.’” (Van Woudenberg, 2005). For another example, Rwanda denies assisting CNDP or its leader, General Nkunda, but there is much evidence to the contrary. For instance, one source states that Nkunda “actively recruits hundreds of his most experienced soldiers within Rwanda” (Van Woudenberg, 2008).
DRC Support for FDLR:
There is plenty of evidence of collaboration between DRC government soldiers and the FDLR. Per an agreement made between the DRC and Rwanda in November, 2007, the DRC government agreed to disarm the FDLR. However, in recent battles, “FDLR combatants joined Congolese army soldiers to fight Nkunda's forces” (Van Woudenberg, 2008). This is an example of explicit support for FDLR and a violation of the DRC’s agreement with Rwanda. Another source states, “although the Congolese government signed the Nairobi agreement, pledging to take steps to end the threat of the FDLR, senior military officials in the government continue to provide arms and other support to that rebel group” (Gambino, 2008, 14-15). Allegedly, the FDLR has received support from the DRC since 1998 (Gambino, 2008, 14-15).
Ethnicity/Structural Violence:
As one source states, conflicts between Rwandophone groups and local ethnic groups were usually over resources such as political power and access to land and resources (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.123). Land access in the Kivu provinces is determined by ethnicity ultimately and tension between Rwandophones and other ethnic groups in the region came about from social inequality (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p.145). Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict was brought to the Kivu region by the massive influx of Interahamwe who fled from Rwanda into the DRC (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p.146). As one source states, “the association of ‘Banyamulenge’ with ‘Tutsi’ was exacerbated by politicians in Kinshasa, who wanted to exclude the entire Kinyarwanda-speaking population in the DRC from political participation” (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p.147). The Banyamulenge sought out Rwanda for help and Rwanda saw it as an ideal leveraging point for getting rid of the Hutu army that was now in the DRC (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p.147) However, after winning the first Congo war with Rwanda’s help, Kabila wanted to break free from Rwanda’s grasp. In order to achieve this he launched new campaigns of ethnic hatred against anyone linked to Rwanda, including the Congolese Tutsi. One source states that “hundreds of Congolese Tutsi were killed in cities across the country” (Van Woudenberg, 2006b).
The government was able to mobilize ethnic hatred partly because of Congolese resentment towards Rwanda for having a presence in eastern DRC. The narrative originated from an equation that developed in eastern DRC that stated “RCD equals Rwandophone (Tutsi) equals Rwanda” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.124). This created a perception that ethnic DRC Tutsi’s were the same as Rwandans and Rwandan rebels; it falsely equated the groups in the minds of the locals. This resulted in the Mai Mai gathering and aligning with “Kabila and Rwandan Hutu rebels to fight their common ‘Tutsi’ enemies, that is, Rwanda, the RCD, and the local Banyarwanda communities” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.124).

Objectives
The DRC has a few objectives in this conflict. They have an explicit objective for autonomy and to rid the DRC of foreign countries’ influence and meddling. This was evidenced by Laurent Kabila’s decision to have Uganda and Rwanda leave the DRC once Kabila seized power. It can also be noted today by the DRC’s actions which indicate they want Rwanda’s hands out of their country. The DRC also has an explicit objective to end the violence. It would appear that the DRC government wants to defeat the rebel groups and end the violence but lack the military power and money necessary to do so. An implicit objective, although possibly stated explicitly at times, is for the DRC to control its own resources. In addition to wanting to get rid of Rwanda’s exploitation as well as the exploitation of rebel groups, DRC also wants to control its own resources and have the money for government funding.
Rwanda’s objectives are somewhat ambiguous. Some of their objectives are clear but some may be a cover for a hidden objective or hidden agenda which is difficult to determine. One explicit objective is to defeat the Hutu rebels, namely the FDLR and Interahamwe in the DRC. Rwanda declared this after the 1994 genocide when many Hutu militants fled to the DRC. Another explicit objective is to defend Rwanda’s shared border with DRC. This is a security concern related directly to the Interahamwe and FDLR which Rwanda fears could try to invade Rwanda. Some sources doubt that Rwanda’s security concerns are still valid. For example, “Kigali (Rwanda’s capital) does not hesitate to use its security concerns as a convenient cover for its continued resource exploitation” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.127).
One verified implicit objective of Rwanda is to exploit DRC resources. One source notes that Rwanda’s true motive comes into question when after five years of having a presence in the DRC, between eight and ten thousand Hutu rebels and Interahamwe still remain. Additionally, evidence suggests that Rwanda keeps contacts with the rebels and their “latitude with the rebels is bigger than Kigali is ready to admit” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.126). While Rwanda’s original motives were not likely tied to minerals, one source states, “economic objectives have superseded security interests as the primary motive of the continued Rwandan presence in Congo” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.126-127).
An unconfirmed implicit objective of Rwanda is control and annexation of eastern DRC. There was fear among Congolese citizens of eastern DRC’s annexation to Rwanda and political domination by Rwanda (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.124). It is also plausible, as one source states, that “the fundamental strategy of Rwanda was the de facto control over the Kivu region” (Arnson & Zartman, 2005, p.148). Rwanda has not confirmed this but some sources have suspected the possibility of such a motive.
Means
The parties have used a variety of means to achieve their objectives. Below are examples of some of the means employed in this conflict, beginning with treaties.
Several treaties have been signed to try to broker an agreement between DRC and Rwanda as well as other parties. The Lusaka cease-fire agreement of 1999 was such a treaty. One critique is it “gave the rebels and their foreign backers almost everything they had asked for” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.121). The Lusaka agreement resulted in a transitional government in Kinshasa in which two rebel groups (RCD and MLC) each took one of the four vice presidencies as well as other government positions (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.121). Another treaty, the Pretoria Agreement, was signed in July, 2002, between the DRC and Rwanda. In the agreement “the DRC agreed to apprehend Rwandan genocidaires that had taken refuge in the country; Rwanda agreed to withdraw its troops from the country” (Aertsen, 2008, p.330).
Power sharing is another means which has been utilized in this conflict. The Lusaka agreement was based largely on power sharing as it included a role for various rebel groups within a new framework for the government. One criticism of power sharing is that “sadly, power sharing has more often than not failed to bring about sustainable peace. This has been particularly true in cases such as the DRC, where the political solutions proposed by external conflict brokers have failed to address the interests of the most powerful player, Rwanda” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.129). The Lusaka agreement included many rebel groups but excluded Rwanda completely.
Belligerence is an obvious means which has been employed by both the DRC and Rwanda. The examples are many but one is when “Rwanda threatened to invade Congo in November 2004 to disarm Rwandan rebels it said pose a risk to its security” The DRC responded by sending 10,000 troops to eastern DRC, “sparking fears that widespread armed conflict could resume” (Aertsen, 2008, p.332).
The use of allies is another means employed by Rwanda. With the power sharing government of the DRC, which resulted from the Lusaka agreement, Rwanda was at risk of losing its hold on the Kivus via RCD. As a result, Rwanda’s strategy involved supporting Serufuli, the governor of North Kivu, who was a close ally of theirs. With the Rwandan governments support, Serufuli was appointed governor of North Kivu in 2000. One source notes that “Serufuli replaced the RCD as Kigali’s key ally in North Kivu” (Bøås & Dunn, 2007, p.125).
The use of allies has also been employed by both the DRC and Rwanda through support for rebel groups. It is a means by which Rwanda achieved its objective of mineral exploitation. It is also a means by which the DRC combated Rwanda.

C/CR Orientations
The parties have mostly employed a competitive orientation and a realpolitik worldview. As noted by Sandole, “if the parties are characterized by a competitive orientation, they will tend to be adversarial, confrontational, and view conflict as a zero-sum game” (Sandole 11). The DRC and Rwanda have competed over minerals and power in eastern DRC. A good example of their competition is the North Kivu war in 2008. What occurred is the DRC “government backed the Hutu FDLR, while Rwanda backed the rebel group with a Tutsi ethnical origin - the CNDP: Needless to say that this situation provoked harsh hostilities between the two governments” (Totolo, 2009).
Interestingly enough, there has recently been a rare example of cooperation between the two parties. On January 20th, 2009, the “Rwandan government unexpectedly arrested its former ally, CNDP leader General Nkunda, and allied with the Congolese government against the FDLR” (Totolo, 2009). While this alliance was formed for the purpose of violence, it could be a promising change in relations between the DRC and Rwanda. The event certainly represents a change in the conflict.
C/CR Environment
The conflict environment is one of exogenous conflict. This means there is no super system that can assert its power and resolve conflicts. As Sandole mentions third parties have to work much harder in an exogenous environment. With few to no mechanisms in place to halt or avert conflict in place, there is nothing to prevent conflict or stop it once it has begun. The parties should be encouraged to put mechanisms in place to prevent war in the future (Sandole).


Pillar 2
This conflict certainly takes place at multiple levels. What follows are some of the ways the sources of the conflict are operative at each level.
Individual Level
The sources at the individual level include violence, rape, psychological damage, basic human needs being deprived, and fear. Structural problems are plentiful as people have lack of food, lack of money, lack of employment, lack of opportunity, lack of education, etc. Civilians are often terrorized and filled with fear by rebels as well as by the army.
Societal Level
Society in the DRC rejects women who have been raped. Therefore women who are raped are often rejected by society, rejected by their families, and left with nowhere to go. The structural violence is very operative at the societal level. Society in the DRC has very weak infrastructure and does little to combat the structural problems. Another source of conflict at the societal level is the lawlessness and impunity. For example, a woman who was raped by men in uniform said “very hard to tell whether they were soldiers or rebels, all we knew and all we saw is that they were in uniforms and armed with machine guns” ("Gold war," 2009). This indicates the people cannot really trust the rebels or the army because civilians find it difficult to tell the two apart. This difficulty is caused not just by the similarity in appearance but also by the way the army acts with impunity. Additionally, the DRC police are also “part of the problem in eastern Congo today, regularly mistreating civilians” (Gambino, 2008, 14-15). Compounding the issue, the DRC “has taken no effective actions to improve the overall performance of the military or police” (Gambino, 2008, 14-15).
International Level
Some of the sources at the international level include the spoilers, mineral exploitation, and international reaction/attention to the conflict. The spoilers such as Rwanda and Uganda are foreign countries exploiting the DRC and fueling the conflict. The mineral exploitation process is operative at the international level. It starts with countries like Rwanda exploiting the DRC. It continues as the minerals are sold to other countries and eventually end up with consumers worldwide. Internationally, little if anything is done to combat this process. For example, on the 60 minutes special on the DRC, it was concluded that the gold is not traced to the source and that most jewelers do not really care where the gold comes from ("Gold war," 2009).
Global/Ecological Level
This conflict is operative at the global level to a much lesser degree than it is at the other three levels. Some examples of the global sources are the fact that relative to the world, DRC has huge mineral wealth. This is potentially a source of the conflict because this is why the conflict occurs at the international level. To clarify, the DRC’s large mineral supply, relative to the rest of the world, draws attention to the DRC by spoilers and foreign countries.
Pillar 3
Very little has been effective in helping or ending the conflict in the DRC. Below are some examples of what has been tried. Most initiatives have been track 1, with very little being done at track 2. Also, while the DRC needs both positive and negative peace, it is critical for the DRC to achieve negative peace first. This has not yet occurred in the true sense; the official war is over but rebel groups still exist and violence is still common.
Conflict Management
An example of conflict management is the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, also known as MONUC. In March, 2007, MONUC had “18,336 total uniformed personnel, including 16,594 troops, 713 military observers, and 1,029 police, costing over $1 billion per year” (Goldberg, 2007). MONUC represents conflict management because the intention of the force is to keep the fire from spreading or to halt the violence. MONUC may have an ideal goal of conflict prevention or settlement, but it has thus far failed to achieve either.
Conflict Settlement
One example of conflict settlement is tracing the gold. Wal-Mart plans to trace 10% of its gold products by next year (2010). Additionally, the Responsible Jewelry Council has said it is developing a framework for the industry that will one day trace gold to the source ("Gold war," 2009). These initiatives potentially fall into conflict settlement because the ideal is to put the fire out. Theoretically, cutting off the source of funding for violent rebel groups will eventually put the fire out and contribute to negative peace. This strategy also has the future looking potential of conflict prevention. If gold is traced to the source and no longer supports rebel groups, the house can be prevented from catching on fire in the future.
Another example of attempted conflict settlement is the two agreements signed by the DRC in 2007 and 2008. The 2007 agreement was signed by the DRC and Rwanda and was supposed to implement steps to eliminate the threat of the FDLR. The 2008 agreement was signed between the DRC and various rebel groups in order to end the fighting in eastern DRC (Gambino, 2008, 14-15). The signees agreed to implement DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) or alternatively to integrate into the DRC army. Both agreements were attempts at conflict settlement but both were reportedly violated (Gambino, 2008, 14-15).
3rd Party Approaches: Competitive vs. Cooperative
The approaches range from cooperative to competitive. MONUC represents a competitive third party approach because it is the presence of a peacekeeping force which is supposed to force parties, in effect, to stop fighting. The treaties are generally cooperative in nature but the Lusaka agreement left out Rwanda so it could be classified as competitive. The with-holding of aid to Rwanda by European countries in 2008 was a competitive approach. What transpired as a result, however, was cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC.
Structural Issues: a Cause or Condition of the Conflict?
With the three pillars concluded, another question came up in my research. When looking at the structural issues in the DRC, it is important to acknowledge that most of the deaths in the DRC are attributed to structural issues such as poverty, disease, malnutrition, etc. (Coghlan et al., 2007, iii). That being said, an important consideration is whether the structural issues, like poverty, are a cause or a condition of the war? This is a critical question because to acknowledge that poverty is a cause of the war is also to acknowledge that most of the deaths in the DRC cannot be attributed to the war at all. To acknowledge poverty as a condition of the war would mean the opposite, that the total deaths are indeed war deaths and the conflict is not being exaggerated.
Looking at a research study conducted in the DRC on crude mortality rate, several facts are apparent. First, only 0.4% of the total deaths in the DRC were a direct result of violence (Coghlan et al., 2007, iii). As mentioned, most deaths were attributable to structural issues which the survey states were caused by “social and economic disturbances caused by conflict” (Coghlan et al., 2007, iii). The survey is suggesting that the excess deaths resulting from the structural issues are a condition and not a cause of the war.
Looking at the results of the survey, in 2004 there was “a national crude mortality rate (CMR) of 2.1 deaths per 1,000 population per month” (Coghlan et al., 2007, 1). In the eastern provinces that number jumped to 2.9 deaths per 1,000 population per month (Coghlan et al., 2007, 1). So what was the prewar data on CMR? The pre-war CMR in the DRC was reportedly 1.2. While pre-war data is limited, “UNICEF’s documented estimate for CMR prior to the 1996 war was 1.2 deaths per 1,000 per month” (Coghlan et al., 2007, 17). In 1998 at least two sources claim the CMR was 1.25. There could be flaws in the data but the surveyors noted that they were “aware of no more authoritative sources or estimates” (Coghlan et al., 2007, 17).
Based on the data above, the pre-war CMR (1.2) is much lower than the current CMR (2.1). This data suggests that the structural issues are most likely a condition of the war and not a cause. One could argue that poverty caused the war in the first place, but this correlation has not been proven in any of the research I found and so there is no base for such a correlation currently. How then, does one explain the rise in structural related deaths after the war? Several explanations are plausible but as one source states, “most of the deaths were caused by disease and malnutrition and could have been prevented if outbursts of violence had not impeded access to humanitarian aid” (Autesserre, 2006). This is just one of the ways in which the conflict has contributed to the rise in structural related deaths.
5. Description of the results of the conflict analysis.
The results of my analysis indicate, as many others have argued, that the minerals are a key source of conflict in the DRC. As John Prendergast stated, “if you do a conflict analysis you will find that when there are spikes in violence it has something to do with contestation over mineral resources” ("Gold war," 2009). I would certainly argue that there are other sources of conflict in the DRC and there is no single source which, if resolved, will cure the conflict. However, the analysis indicates that the minerals sustain Rwanda’s role in the DRC and therefore, allow the conflict to continue. If the conflict is to be resolved, I would argue that the minerals must be addressed first in order to cut off funding to Rwanda and the various rebel groups in the DRC.
Ethnic tensions are another source in this conflict but I would argue that they have been incorrectly argued by some researchers to be the main source of the conflict. Ethnic tensions exist but seem to be used by the government as a tool for combating Rwanda. The influx of Interahamwe additionally fueled the ethnic tensions in the region. Ethnic tensions were also fueled by Rwanda’s presence and role in eastern DRC, which many Congolese resented. This created conditions in which it was easy to mobilize the Congolese against Rwandans and Rwandophones. Ethnic tensions should be addressed, but they are not driving the conflict. I would argue that a process of reconciliation and healing should occur, but only after the minerals are addressed.
Another interesting finding in the analysis was the recent cooperation in 2008 between Rwanda and the DRC against a common enemy, the CNDP. The facts indicate that Rwanda’s cooperation was based on international pressure. The fear of losing western aid and support was the catalyst for Rwanda’s decision to arrest Nkunda. The threat by Western countries to with-hold aid was attributed to a 2008 UN report that the Western countries had read. This example has several promising revelations. One is that the UN reports have power to influence international action. It would be worth analyzing what was in that specific UN report and how it was distributed so that it ended up in the right hands. Two is that international powers have the ability to influence Rwanda heavily if they want to.
Finally, my research indicated that the structural problems were more of a condition than a cause of the conflict. The research suggests that the war has indeed caused or at least exacerbated the structural problems in the DRC.
6. Description of an intervention strategy.
Controlling the minerals would seem vital to any intervention in this conflict. Since the minerals are a major source of the conflict and they sustain Rwanda’s role in the conflict as well as the various rebel groups, addressing them is a must. As one source states, “since there are no binding international agreements to regulate trade in ‘conflict minerals,’ (such as the Kimberly Process for ‘blood diamonds’), armed combatants continue to exploit these minerals with impunity” (Gilpin, Morris, & Funai, 2009, 2-3). The first step to intervention should be to regulate the various minerals so as to cut off funding to Rwanda, Uganda, and the rebel groups. The DRC could then address regaining control over its vast resources and ending occupation by rebel groups.
How would mineral regulation take place? International pressure on Rwanda works, as was proven in 2008, when Rwanda arrested General Nkunda as a direct result of European countries threatening to with hold aid from Rwanda. Pressure could also be exerted on Rwanda to elicit Rwanda’s cooperation in any plan to regulate minerals. An example of prospective mineral regulation involves a plan to regulate Coltan in Germany. One source states that “Germany financed a pilot study for this project, and the Congolese finance minister announced that a "fingerprint" program for Congolese Coltan will be finalized in 2009” (Totolo, 2009). An important note of caution for mineral regulation is that “there is a risk that the international community will give the wrong incentives and that conflicting parties will make decisions only in order to please the western donors, without seeking long-term solutions for the regional hostilities” (Totolo, 2009). Therefore, the process for mineral regulation should be developed carefully, with checks and balances, so that the parties in conflict do not simply find loopholes in the system.
The next step should be for international powers to monitor the DRC government in its takeover of the country and the resources. Due to the government’s history of corruption, it is vital that checks be put in place to insure the government uses the funding from the minerals in a way that benefits the people. Projects for infrastructure, education, jobs, hospitals, etc. must be put in place. International powers could possibly achieve this by refusing to buy the DRC’s minerals if the DRC does not comply with the regulations they establish. The regulations should be established by a panel of several nations to avoid biases and corruption within the regulations. It should also be made a point that some of the nations on the panel be African nations. This could alternatively be achieved by making sure the people of the DRC have a voice in the government, so that they can serve as checks for the government.
With the minerals addressed and the government kept in check, various methods of positive peace would be ready to be designed and implemented. A definite next step would be a process of reconciliation and healing. This is critical because of the ethnic factor in the conflict and all of the violence. The people of the DRC have to live together after the conflict is settled and it is likely unavoidable, as was the case in Rwanda, that victims will have to live side by side with perpetrators of the violence. Therefore, reconciliation is critical for this conflict. Along with reconciliation, a process of justice appropriate for the DRC should be considered. The process should be a regionally appropriate one, like the Gachacha courts were in Rwanda.
In theory, this strategy would prevent Rwanda’s continued role as a spoiler in the DRC. First, by regulating the minerals Rwanda would lose its main objective in the DRC, mineral exploitation. Also, by alleviating structural problems and strengthening the government, the DRC would be better equipped to negotiate with Rwanda on an equal level. The reconciliation could address the ethnic violence between Rwandophones and Congolese, and as mentioned, international pressure could help insure Rwanda’s cooperation. After all these issues are addressed, Rwanda and the DRC should participate in dialogues so that Rwanda is not simply left out of the process once again.
7. Conclusion.
This paper has demonstrated that indeed, the conflict in the DRC is quite complex. Rwanda’s role as a spoiler is significant as the paper has illustrated. Using Sandole’s three pillar approach to map the conflict, several findings became apparent. One finding was that a major source of the conflict is the minerals and Rwanda exploits the DRC’s minerals by supporting rebel groups. It was also mentioned that international powers have the ability, as proven, to influence Rwanda. Additionally, UN reports can influence international powers to apply pressure to Rwanda. When exploring the structural issues, this paper found that structural issues were most likely a condition of the conflict and sufficient evidence was not apparent to suggest otherwise.
Several recommendations were made for an intervention strategy. One of the interventions mentioned was that minerals must be regulated so that only conflict free minerals hit the market. This will strangle Rwanda’s role in the DRC as well as the sustainability of rebel groups. Additionally, international powers should monitor the DRC’s takeover of the country and the minerals to insure that a government of corruption is not put in place. Following this negative peace, structural issues should be addressed and reconciliation is vital for the ethnic dimension of the conflict as well as the crimes committed on civilians during the conflict. Finally, Rwanda should not be left out of the process completely. As Sandole would put it, if Rwanda is left out, they will have no stake in preventing the house from burning down in the future.

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